کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072726 | 1373514 | 2008 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We study a variant of the multi-candidate Hotelling-Downs model that recognizes that politicians, even after declaring candidacy, have the option of withdrawing from the electoral contest before the election date and saving the cost of continuing campaign. We find that this natural variant significantly alters equilibrium predictions. We give conditions for the existence of an equilibrium for an arbitrary finite number of candidates and an arbitrary distribution of single-peaked preferences of voters. We also provide a partial characterization of the equilibrium outcomes that addresses whether policy convergence can be a feature of equilibrium outcomes when more than two candidates enter the electoral contest.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 62, Issue 2, March 2008, Pages 661-674
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 62, Issue 2, March 2008, Pages 661-674
نویسندگان
Abhijit Sengupta, Kunal Sengupta,