کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072750 1373515 2009 10 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability
چکیده انگلیسی

We study the evolution of preferences under perfect and almost perfect observability in symmetric 2-player games. We demonstrate that if nature can choose from a sufficiently general preference space, which includes preferences over outcomes that may depend on the opponent's preference-type, then, in most games, only discriminating preferences (treating different types of opponents differently in the same situation) can be evolutionary stable and some discriminating types are stable in a very strong sense in all games. We use these discriminating types to show that any symmetric outcome which gives players more than their minmax value in material payoffs (fitness) can be seen as equilibrium play of a player population with such strongly stable preferences.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 67, Issue 2, November 2009, Pages 542-551
نویسندگان
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