کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072757 | 1373515 | 2009 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
If a TU game is extendable, then its core is a stable set. However, there are many TU games with a stable core that are not extendable. A coalition is vital if there exists some core element x such that none of the proper subcoalitions is effective for x. It is exact if it is effective for some core element. If all coalitions that are vital and exact are extendable, then the game has a stable core. It is shown that the contrary is also valid for matching games, for simple flow games, and for minimum coloring games.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 67, Issue 2, November 2009, Pages 633-644
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 67, Issue 2, November 2009, Pages 633-644
نویسندگان
Evan Shellshear, Peter Sudhölter,