کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072774 | 1373516 | 2007 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The strong sequential core for stationary cooperative games
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Infinite time horizon stationary cooperative games are considered where at each date the instantaneous NTU-game is determined by the state of nature. The strong sequential core selects those utility streams that no coalition can improve upon by deviating at any moment in time. The main result of the paper states that the strong sequential core is non-empty provided that (i) the instantaneous NTU-games in all states are additively b-balanced, (ii) at least one of these games is strongly additively b-balanced, and (iii) the discount factor is close enough to one.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 61, Issue 1, October 2007, Pages 50-66
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 61, Issue 1, October 2007, Pages 50-66
نویسندگان
Arkadi Predtetchinski,