کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072803 1477083 2007 34 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Optimality and renegotiation in dynamic contracting
چکیده انگلیسی
We characterize the optimal renegotiation-proof contract in a dynamic principal-agent model in which the type of the agent may change stochastically over time. We show that, under general conditions, the optimal contract with commitment is renegotiation proof even when type realizations are serially correlated. When the renegotiation-proofness constraint is binding, it is always optimal to partially screen the types by offering a menu of choices to the agent; and the distortion induced by the renegotiation-proofness constraint is non-decreasing in the persistence of types.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 60, Issue 2, August 2007, Pages 213-246
نویسندگان
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