کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072827 | 1373519 | 2009 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We consider discounted repeated games in which players can voluntarily purchase information about the opponents' actions at past stages. Information about a stage can be bought at a fixed but arbitrary cost. Opponents cannot observe the information purchase by a player. For our main result, we make the usual assumption that the dimension of the set FIR of feasible and individually rational payoff vectors is equal to the number of players. We show that, if there are at least three players and each player has at least four actions, then every payoff vector in the interior of the set FIR can be achieved by a Nash equilibrium of the discounted repeated game if the discount factor is sufficiently close to 1. Therefore, nearly efficient payoffs can be achieved even if the cost of monitoring is high. We show that the same result holds if there are at least four players and at least three actions for each player. Finally, we indicate how the construction can be extended to sequential equilibrium.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 66, Issue 1, May 2009, Pages 126-145
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 66, Issue 1, May 2009, Pages 126-145
نویسندگان
János Flesch, Andrés Perea,