کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072833 | 1373519 | 2009 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We present the experimental results of cheap-talk games with private information. We systematically compare various equilibrium refinement theories and bounded rationality models such as level-k analysis in explaining our experimental data. As in the previous literature, we find that when interests between sender and receiver are aligned, informative communication frequently arises. While babbling equilibrium play is observed more frequently in conflicting interest cases, a substantial number of players tend to choose truth-telling and credulous play. We also find that level-k analysis outperforms equilibrium refinement theories in explaining this phenomenon. Our results also confirm the existence of the “truth bias” and “truth-detection bias” reported in communication theory.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 66, Issue 1, May 2009, Pages 238-255
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 66, Issue 1, May 2009, Pages 238-255
نویسندگان
Toshiji Kawagoe, Hirokazu Takizawa,