کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072841 1373519 2009 10 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A theory of kindness, reluctance, and shame for social preferences
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
A theory of kindness, reluctance, and shame for social preferences
چکیده انگلیسی
Recent experimental evidence from dictator games suggests that proposers take money from receivers when taking is an option, and that many proposers are reluctant to play the game. This paper proposes a behavioral model with two components: a choice correspondence that depends on the endowed allocation and the menu of allocations available, and a preference ordering over endowment/menu pairs. The choice correspondence governs behavior when the proposer actually plays a game, and the preference ordering governs the proposer's willingness to play a particular game. The model is then used to characterize notions of proposer kindness, reluctance, and shame.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 66, Issue 1, May 2009, Pages 394-403
نویسندگان
,