کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5072842 1373519 2009 22 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall
چکیده انگلیسی

The paper initiates the study of long term interactions where players' bounded rationality varies over time. Time dependent bounded rationality, for player i, is reflected in part in the number ψi(t) of distinct strategies available to him in the first t-stages.We examine how the growth rate of ψi(t) affects equilibrium outcomes of repeated games. An upper bound on the individually rational payoff is derived for a class of two-player repeated games, and the derived bound is shown to be tight.As a special case we study the repeated games with nonstationary bounded recall and show that, a player can guarantee the minimax payoff of the stage game, even against a player with full recall, by remembering a vanishing fraction of the past. A version of the folk theorem is provided for this class of games.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 66, Issue 1, May 2009, Pages 404-425
نویسندگان
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