کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072946 | 1373524 | 2006 | 27 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Ascending price Vickrey auctions
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We show that an ascending price auction for multiple units of a homogeneous object proposed by Ausubel (i) raises prices for packages until they reach those nonlinear and non-anonymous market clearing prices at which bidders get their marginal products and (ii) the auction is a primal-dual algorithm applied to an appropriate linear programming formulation in which the dual solution yields those same market clearing prices. We emphasize the similarities with efficient incentive compatible ascending price auctions to implement Vickrey payments when there is a single object or when objects are heterogeneous but each buyer does not desire more than one unit. A potential benefit of these common threads is that it helps to establish the principles upon which Vickrey payments may be implemented through decentralized, incentive compatible procedures.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 55, Issue 2, May 2006, Pages 215-241
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 55, Issue 2, May 2006, Pages 215-241
نویسندگان
Sushil Bikhchandani, Joseph M. Ostroy,