کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5073027 | 1373529 | 2006 | 32 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games Better-reply dynamics and global convergence to Nash equilibrium in aggregative games](/preview/png/5073027.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider n-person games with quasi-concave payoffs that depend on a player's own action and the sum of all players' actions. We show that a discrete-time, stochastic process in which players move towards better replies-the better-reply dynamics-converges globally to a Nash equilibrium if actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements for all players around each Nash equilibrium that is asymptotically stable under a deterministic, adjusted best-reply dynamics. We present an example of a 2-person game with a unique equilibrium where the derivatives of the best-reply functions have different signs and the better-reply dynamics does not converge.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 54, Issue 2, February 2006, Pages 261-292
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 54, Issue 2, February 2006, Pages 261-292
نویسندگان
Martin Dindoš, Claudio Mezzetti,