کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5073041 | 1373530 | 2007 | 22 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence Coordination and cooperation in local, random and small world networks: Experimental evidence](/preview/png/5073041.png)
A laboratory experiment has been designed to study coordination and cooperation in games played on local, random and small-world networks. For the coordination game, the results revealed a tendency for coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium in all three networks, but the frequency of payoff-dominant choices was significantly higher in small-world networks than in local and random networks. For the prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation was hard to reach on all three networks, with average cooperation lower in small-world networks than in random and local networks. Two graph-theoretic characteristics-clustering coefficient and characteristic path length-exhibited a significant effect on individual behavior, possibly explaining why the small-world network, with its high clustering coefficient and short path length, is the architecture of relations that drive a system towards equilibrium at the quickest pace.
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 58, Issue 2, February 2007, Pages 209-230