کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5073071 | 1373532 | 2006 | 29 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Second-price common-value auctions under multidimensional uncertainty
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
The literature has demonstrated that second-price common-value auctions are sensitive to the presence of asymmetries among bidders. In a two-bidder model, Bikhchandani [1988. Reputation in repeated second-price auctions. J. Econ. Theory 46, 97-119] has shown that if it is common knowledge that one bidder has a disadvantage compared to her opponent, that bidder (almost surely) never wins the auction. Employing a similar two-bidder model, this paper shows that this result does not carry over when one allows for two-sided uncertainty. In such case, in every equilibrium, the disadvantaged type bidder needs to win the auction with strictly positive probability. We then solve for the equilibria in two cases, one with two types and another with a continuum of types, and we show that they converge to the symmetric equilibria of the corresponding symmetric auctions. We thus reestablish a lost linkage in the analysis of common-value and almost-common-value auctions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 55, Issue 1, April 2006, Pages 43-71
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 55, Issue 1, April 2006, Pages 43-71
نویسندگان
Maria-Ángeles de Frutos, Lambros Pechlivanos,