کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5073121 | 1373537 | 2006 | 6 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: A note
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
As a justification of the core as a set of stable social states, Sengupta and Sengupta [1996. A property of the core. Games Econ. Behav. 12, 266-273] show that for any transferable utility (TU) cooperative game with non-empty core, for every imputation outside the core there is an element in the core that indirectly dominates the imputation in a desirable way. In this note we show that this appealing property of the core no longer holds even for the class of hyperplane games, an immediate generalization of TU games into the environments without side payments.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 54, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 25-30
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 54, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 25-30
نویسندگان
Anindya Bhattacharya, Abderrahmane Ziad,