کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5073125 | 1373537 | 2006 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Learning to trust in indefinitely repeated games
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
Although it is well known that trust and trustworthiness (i.e., the fulfillment of trust) are important behaviors for the fulfillment of incomplete contracts, less is known about how the economic environment influences them. In this paper we design an experiment to examine how exogenously determined (stochastic) past relationship lengths affect trust and trustworthiness in new relationships. We find that shorter-lasting relationships have an immediate negative impact on both behaviors in the relationships that immediately follow, while longer-lasting relationships have the opposite effect. The effect of stochastic end-points declines for trustworthiness but not for trust as subjects gain experience, indicating that trust is able to rebound when longer-lasting relationships follow shorter-lasting ones.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 54, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 95-114
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 54, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 95-114
نویسندگان
J. Engle-Warnick, Robert L. Slonim,