کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5073131 | 1373537 | 2006 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The effect of exit on entry deterrence strategies
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
Recent analyses of entry deterrence strategies have required an incumbent's post-entry output or pricing strategy to be profit maximizing. However, most papers have continued to assume that either an incumbent can commit not to exit after entry or that exit is never optimal. When there are avoidable fixed costs of operating in any period, however, exit can be the optimal strategy. In this situation, entry deterrence strategies operate very differently than when exit is never optimal. In fact, the possibility of exit can make some, previously effective, strategies completely ineffective while improving the effectiveness of others.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 54, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 226-240
Journal: Games and Economic Behavior - Volume 54, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 226-240
نویسندگان
Abraham L. Wickelgren,