Bundling, Ã la carte pricing and vertical bargaining in a two-sided model

We develop a two-sided market model with an upstream-downstream structure. More specifically, the platform consists of two rival upstream firms and a downstream monopolist. Each upstream firm negotiates the input price (license fee) with the downstream monopolist and also chooses the amount of advertising that is embedded in the good it sells to the downstream monopolist. The downstream monopolist can offer the two goods either on an à la carte basis or as a bundle. We use this model to understand the incentives to bundle and the welfare properties of bundling in a two-sided market framework. We also contribute to the ongoing debate on à la carte pricing in the TV industry, where the two upstream firms can be viewed as two rival TV networks and the downstream monopolist as a cable operator. We show that an à la carte regulation will raise consumer surplus and downstream profit, while it will decrease the profits of the upstream TV networks.