کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5077838 | 1477313 | 2015 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Firm reputation and incentives to “milk” pending patents
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
شهرت شرکت و انگیزه های آن اخطار
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper we develop a theory of patenting in which a firm preserves its reputation by only applying for a patent whenever a truly patentable idea has been generated. Firms have a short-run incentive to deviate and receive additional rents from unworthy pending patents, as well as potential rents from PTO mistakes in granting patents. We provide conditions for reputation to be preserved in equilibrium and analyze which market environments are favorable for such an equilibrium to exist. In particular, we analyze the merits of different patent systems.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 43, November 2015, Pages 18-29
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 43, November 2015, Pages 18-29
نویسندگان
Johannes Koenen, Martin Peitz,