کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078119 | 1477326 | 2013 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Trading between agents for a better match
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
بازرگانی بین عوامل برای یک بازی بهتر
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies externalities that arise when agents can trade outcomes ex post. I show that when agents can trade outcomes ex post, principals are incentivized to contract with agents ex ante to reduce ex post transfers to outside agents with whom the principals do not directly contract. This causes principals to offer agents piece-rates that are inefficiently low and lower than the piece-rates they would offer if trading was not allowed. Although trading reduces an agent's effort and could increase the agent's outside option of rejecting a principal's ex ante contract, principals ultimately gain from allowing ex post trading because such trading results in outcomes that better match their tastes.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 31, Issue 5, September 2013, Pages 501-515
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 31, Issue 5, September 2013, Pages 501-515
نویسندگان
Frances (Zhiyun Xu) Lee,