کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078282 | 1477345 | 2010 | 5 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Vertical merger, collusion, and disruptive buyers
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of vertical mergers. We show that any vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion, no matter how large (in terms of capacity or size of product portfolio) the integrated downstream buyer. But a vertical merger with a larger buyer helps more to facilitate upstream collusion than a similar merger with a smaller buyer. This formalizes the idea expressed in the U.S. and EU Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines that some downstream buyers may be more “disruptive” of collusive schemes than others.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 28, Issue 4, July 2010, Pages 350-354
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 28, Issue 4, July 2010, Pages 350-354
نویسندگان
Volker Nocke, Lucy White,