کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078559 | 1477360 | 2008 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Intimidating competitors - Endogenous vertical integration and downstream investment in successive oligopoly
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper examines the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and cost-reducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly. Analyzing a linear Cournot model, we establish the following key results: (i) Vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment (intimidation effect). (ii) Asymmetric integration is a non-degenerate equilibrium outcome. (iii) Compared to a benchmark model without investment, complete vertical separation is a less likely outcome. We argue that these findings generalize beyond the linear Cournot model under reasonable assumptions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 26, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 247-265
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 26, Issue 1, January 2008, Pages 247-265
نویسندگان
Stefan Buehler, Armin Schmutzler,