کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078590 | 1477372 | 2006 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Collusion with capacity constraints over the business cycle
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper investigates the effect of capacity constraints on the sustainability of collusion in markets subject to cyclical demand fluctuations. In the absence of capacity constraints, Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) [Haltiwanger, J., Harrington, J., 1991. The impact of cyclical demand movements on collusive behavior. Rand Journal of Economics. 22, 89-106.] show that firms find it more difficult to collude during periods of decreasing demand. We find that this prediction can be overturned if firms' capacities are sufficiently small. Capacity constraints imply that punishment profits move procyclically, so that periods of increasing demand may lead to lower losses from cheating even if collusive profits are rising. Haltiwanger and Harrington's main prediction remains valid for sufficiently large capacities.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 24, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 69-81
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 24, Issue 1, January 2006, Pages 69-81
نویسندگان
Natalia Fabra,