کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078661 | 1477359 | 2008 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Umbrella branding and the provision of quality
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Consider a two-product firm that decides on the quality of each product. Product quality is unknown to consumers. If the firm sells both products under the same brand name, consumers adjust their beliefs about quality subject to the performance of both products. We show that if the probability that low quality will be detected is in an intermediate range, the firm produces high quality under umbrella branding whereas it would sell low quality in the absence of umbrella branding. Hence, umbrella branding mitigates the moral hazard problem. We also find that umbrella branding survives in asymmetric markets and that one product may even be sold at a loss to stabilize the umbrella brand. In general, umbrella branding does not necessarily imply high quality; the firm may choose low-quality products with positive probability.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 26, Issue 2, March 2008, Pages 546-556
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 26, Issue 2, March 2008, Pages 546-556
نویسندگان
Hendrik Hakenes, Martin Peitz,