کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078662 | 1477359 | 2008 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment Market performance and collusion in sequential and simultaneous multi-object auctions: Evidence from an ascending auctions experiment](/preview/png/5078662.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We compare efficiency and susceptibility to collusion of two alternative ways to sell multiple objects in independent private values environments: simultaneous and sequential ascending auctions. Both auctions are common in the real world. With explicit communication among bidders, collusion was more frequent in sequential than in simultaneous auctions. We further analyze collusive schemes adopted by bidders.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 26, Issue 2, March 2008, Pages 557-572
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 26, Issue 2, March 2008, Pages 557-572
نویسندگان
Katerina Sherstyuk, Jeremy Dulatre,