کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078707 | 1477368 | 2006 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The hold-up problem in a repeated relationship
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
Much of the literature on what determines the scope of operations of a producer has centered on the “hold-up problem”. The standard results indicate the hold-up problem may lead to suboptimal investments, and therefore integration may improve the organization of production. In this paper, we consider a repeated relationship with durable investments and show the possibility of integration improves the choice of investments and there is no integration in equilibrium. The equilibrium contract is non-exclusive, in order to allow the buyer to choose integration in later periods. We derive this result in the presence of very simple and incomplete contracts.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 24, Issue 5, September 2006, Pages 953-970
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 24, Issue 5, September 2006, Pages 953-970
نویسندگان
Marco A. Castaneda,