کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078759 | 1477358 | 2008 | 8 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Partial coordination and mergers among quantity-setting firms
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze horizontal mergers in a collusive environment by using an infinitely repeated game where (i) a subset of collusive firms is exogenously given and (ii) partially collusive arrangements are allowed for. We show that, in our model, there is no clear relation between the existence of mergers and full collusion at equilibrium. However, we demonstrate that the presence of mergers generally leads to a price increase. Also, we show that cartel firms have less incentives to merge than firms in a Cournot oligopoly, and that collusion increases fringe firms' incentives to merge.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 26, Issue 3, May 2008, Pages 803-810
Journal: International Journal of Industrial Organization - Volume 26, Issue 3, May 2008, Pages 803-810
نویسندگان
Marc Escrihuela-Villar,