کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5079296 1477529 2016 15 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A revenue-sharing option contract toward coordination of supply chains
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
گزینه قرارداد به اشتراک درآمد برای هماهنگی زنجیره تامین
کلمات کلیدی
قرارداد اختیاری، قرارداد به اشتراک درآمد، قرارداد گزینه مشترک اشتراک درآمد، نظریه بازی، هماهنگی زنجیره تامین، حاشیه سازی دوگانه،
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه سایر رشته های مهندسی مهندسی صنعتی و تولید
چکیده انگلیسی

In this paper, a novel mixed revenue-sharing option contract is introduced to coordinate a retailer-manufacturer supply chain. A European call option mechanism and a revenue-sharing mechanism are combined to cover drawbacks of the classic contracts. The option can increase the profit of the chain and the revenue-sharing can reduce double marginalization effects. In addition, an instantaneous purchase and a shortage penalty mechanism are introduced. The proposed mixed contract is modeled through a game theoretic approach to examine several possible situations in order to obtain the order quantity of the retailer and the production quantity of the manufacturer in the Nash equilibrium. Also, both the retailer and the manufacturer are considered as the leader of the chain to recommend an appropriate contract conditions for various types of industries and markets. Finally, the best conditions for achieving the supply chain coordination are provided in different situations. Results also demonstrate that the mixed contract dominates a wholesale and a basic option contract. The proposed coordination mechanism is applied in a real fashion apparel supply chain in Iran and a comprehensive sensitivity analysis is implemented on some parameters of the contract to provide some managerial insights for the supply chain members.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Journal of Production Economics - Volume 178, August 2016, Pages 42-56
نویسندگان
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