Analysis for strategy of closed-loop supply chain with dual recycling channel

This paper investigates optimal strategies of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with dual recycling channel, within which the manufacturer sells products via the retailer in the forward supply chain, while the retailer and the third party competitively collect used products in the reverse supply chain. Based on game theory, we characterize the supply chain performance in terms of the pricing decisions and the recycling strategies for both the decentralized and the centralized channel scenarios. By comparing this work with the existing optimal strategies of the CLSC with single recycling channel (the retailer or the third party), we derive the parameter domain which is defined as the set of competing intensities for which the CLSC with dual recycling channel outperforms the CLSC with single recycling channel from the perspectives of the manufacturer and the consumers, respectively. Moreover, we give some suggestions, which will present paramount social value, to the macro-control policy making by exhaustive numerical analysis. The results in this paper can be used as a reference for choosing recycling model, the single recycling channel or the dual recycling channel, for collecting used products.