کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5085942 1478094 2006 15 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Formal and relational incentives in a multitask model
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Formal and relational incentives in a multitask model
چکیده انگلیسی

This paper studies the optimal contracts in a multitask model when a principal-agent relationship is long-term. If some outcomes are unverifiable, then the contracts have to satisfy the self-enforcing condition. I characterize the optimal contract in terms of the discount rate, the cost substitutes, and the weight of the unverifiable outcomes relative to the principal's payoff. Then, as the discount rate increases, the incentive to verifiable outcome (formal incentive) changes discontinuously and non-monotonically while the incentive to the unverifiable outcome (relational incentive) changes discontinuously but monotonically.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: International Review of Law and Economics - Volume 26, Issue 3, September 2006, Pages 380-394
نویسندگان
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