Keywords: C91; D91; J22; J33; L2; M5; Contest; Tournament; Real-effort; Experiment; Contract theory; Forward-looking;
مقالات ISI (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: C6; F22; J33; J41; Migration; Taxing migrants; Target migrants; Non-target migrants;
Keywords: Deferred compensation; Executive compensation; Principal-agent model; G34; J33; M52;
Keywords: Ultimatum game; Altruism; Competition; Incomplete information; C78; J33;
Keywords: D12; H23; J33; R40; Q58; R48; Parking cash-out; Employer-paid parking; Fringe benefit; Discrete choice; Modal choice; Cash-out elasticity;
Keywords: Telecom companies; CEO compensation; State ownership; Corporate governance; G38; J33; L51; L96;
Keywords: Bargaining; Experiment; Gender; Payment scheme; C78; C91; D82; J16; J33;
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility (CSR); CEO compensation; CEO compensation structure; Equity-based compensation; Cash-based compensation; Corporate governance; G30; G34; J33; M14;
Keywords: Employee stock options; Turnover; J33; J63; G30;
Keywords: Feedback; Personnel; Motivation; Productivity; Experiment; Incentives; J24; M52; J33; C91; D23;
Keywords: I31; J30; J33; R41; Commute time; Life satisfaction; Happiness; Urban China;
Keywords: D86; K31; M52; J33; J79; Contracts; Employer liability; Moral hazard; Incomplete information;
Keywords: J33; J31; J24; D81; D82; C93; Rank-order tournaments; Incentives; Prize spread; Risk-aversion; Randomized experiment;
Keywords: Paid leave; Sick leave; Externality; Contagious; J75; I18; J33; J38;
Keywords: Competitiveness; Gender; Age; Field experiment; C93; J16; J19; J33;
Keywords: Executive compensation; Managerial diversion; Product market behavior; State-owned enterprises; China; J33; G30;
Keywords: Expectation-based loss aversion; Specialization; Multitasking; Implementation; Complementarities; J41; J24; D21; D03; D86; D90; J33;
Keywords: G30; G34; J33; M51; CEO turnover; CEO succession; CEO labor market;
Keywords: D86; D90; J33; Fixed wages; Deferred incentives; Dynamic moral hazard; Expectation-based reference-dependent preferences; Loss aversion;
Keywords: Executive compensation; Limited liability; Options; Risk management; Relative performance evaluation; D86; G32; G34; J33;
Keywords: Executive compensation; CEO risk-taking incentives; Socially irresponsible activities; G31; G32; G34; J33; M14;
Keywords: G32; G34; G38; J31; J33; CEO power; Market competition; Firm value;
Keywords: Stock options; Credit default swaps; Risk management; Vega; Bank risk-taking; Credit crisis; G21; G32; J33;
Keywords: Labor markets; Piece rate contracts; Gender; Becker-DeGroot-Marschak; Malawi; C93; J22; J24; J33; O12;
Keywords: Executive compensation; Taxation; Stock options; H2; J33; M12;
Keywords: G32; J31; J33; O30; O33; Innovation; Patents; Citations; Power; CEO pay slice;
Keywords: M12; M52; G3; G34; J3; J33; Governance; Boards; Busy; Compensation; Directors;
Keywords: CEO risk-taking; CEO turnover; Board independence; G21; G30; J33;
Keywords: G21; G34; J33; Banks; Inside debt; CEO incentives; Mergers and acquisitions;
Keywords: Firm size measures; Total assets; Total sales; Market capitalization; Empirical corporate finance; G3; G30; G31; G32; G34; G35; C23; C58; J31; J33;
Keywords: CEO compensation; Dynamic principal-agent model; Structural estimation; G32; G34; J33;
Keywords: M52; M55; J33; G34; G32; G13; M41; Performance-vesting provisions; Executive compensation; Stock awards; Option awards; Time-vesting; Performance measures; CEO pay; Corporate governance;
Keywords: G20; G28; J33; J44; M14; M52; Investment advisors; Agency problems; Textual analysis; Readability;
Keywords: Severance pay; Pay-for-performance; Vega; Optimal executive compensation; G32; G34; J33;
Keywords: Agency; Luck; Rewards and bonuses; 2910; C91; D64; D81; J33;
Keywords: D03; J33; M5; C91; Experiment; Principal-agent; Unexpected rewards; Recognition; Bonus; Relative performance feedback;
Keywords: Financial incentives; Motivation; Crowding; Power; Exploitation; Experiment; C92; J33; M52; M55;
Keywords: G34; G38; J33; CEO compensation; Director compensation; Pay reciprocity; CEO board membership;
Keywords: C91; J24; J33; J39; Experiment; Payment scheme; Tournament; Piece-rate; Learning;
Keywords: Deferred income; Executive compensation; Tax policy; Elasticity of taxable income; G30; H24; H32; J33;
Keywords: Severance; Unfair dismissal; Graded security; Legal systems; J63; J65; J33;
Keywords: Narrow bracketing; Multi-stage contest; Framing; Experiment; C72; D81; M52; J33;
Keywords: D72; H70; J33; Selection; Public office rewards; Political parties; Quality of politicians; Information manipulation;
Keywords: J33; J41; D86; J4; M52; M51; Self-selection; Contracting; Individual characteristics; Risk preferences; Psychological traits;
Keywords: M52; J33; J45; D82; Pay for performance; Public sector management; Information and communication technologies; Asymmetric information; Motivations; Optimal contracts;
Keywords: CEO compensation; CEO incentives; Financial crisis; Financial deregulation; Federal emergency loans; G01; G21; G32; J33; M12; M52;
Keywords: Employment contracts; CEO compensation; Contract explicitness; G34; G38; J31; J33;
Keywords: D03; J33; M52; Locus of control; Risk attitude; Performance appraisal; Performance pay; Sorting; Extrinsic rewards; Intrinsic motivation;
Keywords: F14; F16; J33; O33; Wage inequality; International trade; Technological change; Skill-intensity;
Keywords: C61; C73; J33; L24; Relational contracts; Limited liability; Efficiency wages;