دانلود مقالات ISI درباره J33 + ترجمه فارسی

Performance choice, executive bonuses and corporate leverage

Keywords: G32; M41; M52; J33; Corporate capital structure; Corporate leverage; Executive compensation; Executive incentive schemes; Agency costs of debt;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 20 صفحه سال انتشار : 2012 سفارش ترجمه

Nonprofit boards: Size, performance and managerial incentives

Keywords: D21; G34; J33; L31; M40; Nonprofits; Incentives; Boards of directors;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 22 صفحه سال انتشار : 2012 سفارش ترجمه

Management compensation and market timing under portfolio constraints

Keywords: D81; D82; J33; Market timing; Incentive fee; Benchmarking; Portfolio constraints;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 26 صفحه سال انتشار : 2012 سفارش ترجمه

Tournament incentives, firm risk, and corporate policies

Keywords: G31; G32; G34; J31; J33; L14Tournament incentives; Firm risk; Corporate policies

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 27 صفحه سال انتشار : 2012 سفارش ترجمه

Managerial Incentives and the Choice between Public and Bank Debt

Keywords: G32; G34; J33; D82; Managerial incentives; Asset substitution; Stockholder-bondholder conflicts; Bond yields; Loan spread;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 27 صفحه سال انتشار : 2012 سفارش ترجمه

Reputation penalties for poor monitoring of executive pay: Evidence from option backdating

Keywords: G34; J33; M41; M52Option backdating; Director labor market; Shareholder voting; Director turnover; Corporate governance

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 27 صفحه سال انتشار : 2012 سفارش ترجمه

Parental education, labor market experience and earnings: New wine in an old bottle?

Keywords: J30; J31; J33; Parental education; Human capital; Earnings;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 4 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Discussion of “Are voluntary disclosures that disavow the reliability of mandated fair value information informative or opportunistic?”

Keywords: D82; J33; M41; Disclosure; Stock-based compensation; SFAS 123; Financial reporting discretion;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 7 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

The impact of firm strategy on performance measures used in executive compensation

Keywords: M41; J33; D40Executive compensation; Firm strategy; Cost leadership; Differentiation

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 7 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Teachers’ unions and compensation: The impact of collective bargaining on salary schedules and performance pay schemes

Keywords: I22; J51; J33; J41Teacher salaries; Educational finance; Resource allocation

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 10 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Do salaries improve worker performance?

Keywords: J33; M52Incentives; Salaries; Productivity; Sports

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 10 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Measuring R&D curtailment among short-horizon CEOs

Keywords: G34; M41; J33; Horizon problem; R&D spending; Empirical design;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 11 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Performance pay, risk attitudes and job satisfaction

Keywords: D80; J24; J28; J33; M52Performance pay; Worker heterogeneity; Ability; Risk preferences; Sorting

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 11 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Optimal executive compensation: Stock options or restricted stocks

Keywords: D82; G34; J33; Executive compensation; Information manipulation; Stock option; Corporate governance;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 12 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Does tax policy affect executive compensation? Evidence from postwar tax reforms

Keywords: G30; H24; H32; J33; J31; N32Executive compensation; Tax policy; Elasticity of taxable income

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 13 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Backdating executive stock options-An ex ante valuation

Keywords: Backdating of executive stock options; Exotic lookback options; SOX; J33; M52; G13;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 13 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Curbing cream-skimming: Evidence on enrolment incentives

Keywords: H72; J33; L14Performance measurement; Performance standard; Cream-skimming; Enrolment incentives; Bureaucrat behavior; Public organizations

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 13 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Target ratcheting and effort reduction

Keywords: J33; M40; Target setting; Ratchet effect; Manipulating real economic activities;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 15 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Mutual funds as monitors: Evidence from mutual fund voting

Keywords: G32; G34; J33; Proxy voting; Mutual funds; Corporate governance; Shareholder proposals;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 15 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

CEO incentives and bank risk

Keywords: G01; G21; G32; J33; CEO compensation; Bank risk; Bank regulation; Bank failure; Bank; EDF;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 16 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

The two sides of CEO option grants at the IPO

Keywords: G24; G30; J33; Stock options; Board independence; Venture capital involvement; CEO power; Initial public offerings; Underpricing; Conflicts of interests; Corporate governance;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 16 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

A model of dynamic compensation and capital structure

Keywords: Continuous-time contracting; Capital structure; CARA (exponential) preference; Firm growth; Size-heterogeneity; Pay-performance sensitivityG32; D86; J33

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 16 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations

Keywords: G30; G34; J33; K22Merger negotiations; Stock options; Takeover premium

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 18 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

CEO pay incentives and risk-taking: Evidence from bank acquisitions

Keywords: G21; G34; G33; J33; Banks; Mergers; Default risk; CEO compensation;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 18 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Three retirement decision models for defined contribution pension plan members: A simulation study

Keywords: G11; J26; J33; Defined contribution pension plan; Dynamic and stochastic simulation; One-year retirement decision model; Two-thirds model; Option-value of continued work model;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 18 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market

Keywords: J33; G21; G32; Perquisites; Bank ownership; Conflict of interest;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 19 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Bankers' compensation and fair value accounting

Keywords: M41; M43; G20; J33; Clawback problem; Fair value accounting; Cash bonus; Compensation; Banking crisis;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 20 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Equity grants to target CEOs during deal negotiations

Keywords: G34; J33; K22; M52Mergers; Acquisitions; Bargaining; Negotiation; Compensation; Governance

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 21 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

The CEO pay slice

Keywords: D23; G32; G38; J33; J44; K22Executive compensation; Corporate governance; CEO; Options; Tobin's q; Entrenchment; CEO turnover; Independent directors; CEO chair; Acquisitions; Empire-building; Opportunistic timing; Backdating; CEO turnover; Variability of

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 23 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Gender differences in executive compensation: Variation with board gender composition and time

Keywords: G34; J16; J33; J44Executive compensation; Gender differences; Wage decompositions

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 23 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts

Keywords: G32; J33; L14; Optimal contracts; Executive compensation; Managerial labor market; Firm-specific vs. general skills;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 30 صفحه سال انتشار : 2011 سفارش ترجمه

Sorting, incentives and risk preferences: Evidence from a field experiment

Keywords: J33; M52; C93; Risk aversion; Sorting; Incentive contracts; Field experiments;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 4 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Evidence on performance pay and risk aversion

Keywords: J33; M52; D80; Agency theory; Incentives; Pay for performance; Risk; Risk aversion;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 4 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Product market competition, incentives and fraudulent behavior

Keywords: G30; J33; Executive compensation; Fraud; Incentives; Product market competition;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 4 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Minimum wages and excessive effort supply

Keywords: D82; D86; J33; Bonuses; Limited liability; Minimum wages;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 4 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Performance pay and dynamic social preferences

Keywords: C86; J33; M523020; 3630; 3660Performance pay; Multiagent moral hazard; Social preferences

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 7 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Profit sharing and the quality of relations with the boss

Keywords: J28; J33; J53Mutual monitoring; Job satisfaction; Supervision; Profit shares

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 9 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Is it timing or backdating of option grants?

Keywords: G32; J33; Backdating; Change of rules; Scheduled and unscheduled option grants;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 9 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Expensing of share-based payments and its impact on large UK companies

Keywords: J33; M41; M52Share-based payment; Expensing

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 11 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Psychological bias and gender wage gap

Keywords: J16; J33; J71Bias; Gender; Optimal contract; Wage gap

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 11 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Technology choice, relative performance pay, and worker heterogeneity

Keywords: D82; D86; J33; M52Complementarities; Heterogeneous workers; Production technology; Relative performance pay

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 11 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Pay as incentive or pay as reward? The case of Taiwan

Keywords: J3; J30; J33; J41; Efficiency wages; Linear feedback; Labor productivity; Taiwanese labor market;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 11 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Corporate governance myths: Comments on Armstrong, Guay, and Weber

Keywords: D21; D23; J33; K22; L14; L20; M40; M41; Corporate governance; Financial accounting; Agency costs; Contracting; Debt contracts;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 11 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Optimal tournament contracts for heterogeneous workers

Keywords: D86; J33; M52Heterogeneous workers; Limited liability; Rank-order tournaments; Self-commitment

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 12 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Effort dynamics in supervised work groups

Keywords: C02; D23; D63; J33; L2; Inequity; Work group; Conflict; Dynamical system; Multistability; Organizational behavior;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 13 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

The effect of noise in a performance measure on work motivation: A real effort laboratory experiment

Keywords: C91; J33; M52Performance measures; Noise; Work motivation; Experiments

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 15 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Constrainedly fair job assignments under minimum wages

Keywords: C78; D02; D63; J33; Minimum wages; Job assignment; Constrained fairness; Dynamic mechanism design; Incentives; Non-manipulability;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 15 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

A dynamic analysis of executive stock options: Determinants and consequences

Keywords: G32; J33; Executive stock options; Growth opportunity; Capital investment and performance; Dynamic analysis;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 16 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Executive pay and “independent” compensation consultants

Keywords: G38; J33; M48; M52; Executive compensation; Disclosure; Corporate governance; Board of directors; Compensation consultants;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 16 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه

Optimal incentive contracts under inequity aversion

Keywords: D23; D63; J31; J33; M12; Z13; Contract theory; Linear contracts; Incentives; Sufficient statistics result; Inequity aversion; Incomplete contracts;

دانلود رایگان متن کامل مقاله ISI 17 صفحه سال انتشار : 2010 سفارش ترجمه