کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5086514 | 1478181 | 2017 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Leaving before bad times: Does the labor market penalize preemptive director resignations?
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
از دست دادن قبل از زمان های بد: آیا بازار کار مجازات اخراج مدیران پیش شرط است؟
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
چکیده انگلیسی
When firms experience negative events such as lawsuits or earnings restatements, their directors also suffer. But what about those who leave shortly before the events? I show that directors who leave prior to negative events experience greater declines in the number of their directorships than directors who stay through the events, but smaller declines than directors who leave after the events. These declines do not appear to be voluntary or driven by forced departures. Instead, they appear to be the results of labor market penalties. The results suggest that resigning pre-emptively does not protect directors from labor market penalties.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Economics - Volume 63, Issues 2â3, AprilâMay 2017, Pages 161-178
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Economics - Volume 63, Issues 2â3, AprilâMay 2017, Pages 161-178
نویسندگان
Ying Dou,