کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5086546 | 1478183 | 2016 | 71 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Disciplining delegated monitors: When venture capitalists fail to prevent fraud by their IPO firms
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
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چکیده انگلیسی
Information-based theories of financial intermediation focus on delegated monitoring. However, there is little evidence on how markets discipline intermediaries who fail at this function. We exploit the direct link between corporate fraud and monitoring failure and examine how a venture capital (VC) firm׳s reputation is affected when it fails to prevent fraud in its portfolio companies. We find that reputation-damaged VCs interact differently in the future with their limited partners, other VCs, and IPO underwriters because they are perceived as ineffective monitors. In addition, VCs that fail to prevent fraud experience greater difficulty in taking future portfolio companies public.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Economics - Volume 61, Issues 2â3, AprilâMay 2016, Pages 526-544
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Economics - Volume 61, Issues 2â3, AprilâMay 2016, Pages 526-544
نویسندگان
Xuan Tian, Gregory F. Udell, Xiaoyun Yu,