کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5086589 | 1375257 | 2017 | 22 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Perverse incentives of special purpose acquisition companies, the “poor man's private equity funds”
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
انگیزه های ناشی از شرکت های خاص کسب هدف خاص، سرمایه گذاری خصوصی سهامدار فقیر
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
چکیده انگلیسی
Special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs) are an alternative investment, structured as a one-shot private equity (PE) deal. Significant cross-sectional variation exists in SPACs' performance, which can be explained by the strong implicit incentives embedded in contracts. SPAC performance is worse for acquisitions announced near the predetermined two-year deadline, for acquisitions with deferred initial public offering underwriting fees, and for acquisitions with market value close to the required 80% threshold. Also, sponsors' involvement in the merged firm's governance improves long-term performance. This evidence has important implications given SPACs' high popularity in recent years and the new PE industry's trend toward deal-by-deal fund-raising.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Economics - Volume 63, Issue 1, February 2017, Pages 99-120
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Economics - Volume 63, Issue 1, February 2017, Pages 99-120
نویسندگان
Lora Dimitrova,