کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5086670 | 1478186 | 2014 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
- Audit-quality choice is one choice among many that managers make to maximize firm value.
- Definitions of audit quality should consider the competitive advantage of auditors.
- We question whether auditâquality differences are of significant interest to investors.
- Audit quality research should incorporate tests for externalities and inefficiencies.
We view audit-quality choice as one among many that managers make to maximize firm value. We question whether audit-quality differences among publicly traded companies are of significant interest to investors, clients, and auditors and ask for research on this topic. Relatedly, we ask for research on whether auditors and their clients show behavior consistent with regulated audit quality exceeding the audit quality level demanded absent regulation. We propose that researchers incorporate the competitive advantages of auditors and the institutional features of the audit process into the definition of audit quality. We propose that audit quality research test for externalities and inefficiencies to understand whether auditors and their clients are choosing the efficient level of audit quality. We note the legislative, judicial, and executive powers residing in the PCAOB.
Journal: Journal of Accounting and Economics - Volume 58, Issues 2â3, NovemberâDecember 2014, Pages 327-338