کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5094382 1478494 2015 15 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Pay, peek, punish? Repayment, information acquisition and punishment in a microcredit lab-in-the-field experiment
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
پرداخت، زیرچشمی نگاه کردن، مجازات؟ بازپرداخت، کسب اطالعات و مجازات در یک آزمایش آزمایشگاهی در حوزه خرد
کلمات کلیدی
قرضه کوچک اعطای وام گروه مشترک، به طور پیش فرض استراتژیک، مجازات همکار، مجازات بیش از حد، آزمایشی آزمایشگاهی در آزمایشگاه،
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
Despite remarkable repayment rates in microcredit group lending, anecdotal evidence from the field suggests that there is excessive punishment among group members. To quantify excessive peer punishment, I conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment with actual microcredit borrowers in rural India. I design a repayment coordination game with strategic default and the possibility of acquiring information about a peer's investment return (peer peeking) and of sanctioning a peer (peer punishment). I observe loan repayment of over 90% and punishment of around 85%. Punishment is classified as excessive compared to a game-theoretically derived benchmark of zero punishment and a behaviorally-rooted benchmark of unjust punishment. This gives solid support to the anecdotal evidence and manifests the concern of excessive peer pressure in microcredit group lending. The most promising explanation is that borrowers have internalized the mission indoctrination of the microlender of what constitutes a good borrower, namely repaying loans and disciplining peers.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 117, November 2015, Pages 119-133
نویسندگان
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