کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5095138 1376271 2008 6 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Assortative matching, adverse selection, and group lending
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Assortative matching, adverse selection, and group lending
چکیده انگلیسی
This note reconsiders a theoretical result asserted to explain the success of group lending programs in LDCs. It has been claimed that if groups are allowed to form themselves, risky and safe borrowers will sort themselves into relatively homogenous groups. This “positive assortative matching” can be exploited by lenders to solve an adverse selection problem that would otherwise undermine the effectiveness of such lending programs. I show that the positive assortative matching result does not necessarily hold if earlier models are extended to incorporate dynamic incentives.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 87, Issue 1, August 2008, Pages 51-56
نویسندگان
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