کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5095168 | 1376273 | 2008 | 20 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Constitutions and the resource curse
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Utilizing the fact that natural resources are randomly distributed among countries, we investigate how public income shocks have different long run economic effects dependent on constitutional arrangements. We find that (i) the so-called 'resource curse' is present in democratic presidential countries-but not in democratic parliamentary countries, (ii) being parliamentary or presidential matters more for the growth effects of natural resources than being democratic or autocratic, and (iii) natural resources are more likely to reduce growth when proportional electoral systems are in place than when the electoral systems are majoritarian. The two first effects appear very robust, the last effect less so.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 87, Issue 2, October 2008, Pages 227-246
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 87, Issue 2, October 2008, Pages 227-246
نویسندگان
Jørgen Juel Andersen, Silje Aslaksen,