کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5095230 | 1376277 | 2007 | 27 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
In this paper we suggest that the dual role played by the IMF, as a creditor and as a monitor of economic reforms, might explain the lack of credibility of the Fund threat of sanctioning non-compliance with conditionality. Specifically, we show that the IMF's desire to preserve its reputation as a good monitor may distort its lending decisions towards some laxity. Moreover, such distortionary incentives may be exacerbated by the length of the relationship between a country and the Fund. Estimating a dynamic panel of 53 middle-income countries, for the period 1982-2001, we find that a longer relationship does increase IMF disbursements.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 84, Issue 2, November 2007, Pages 640-666
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 84, Issue 2, November 2007, Pages 640-666
نویسندگان
Silvia Marchesi, Laura Sabani,