کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5095278 | 1376280 | 2007 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Coordinating development: Can income-based incentive schemes eliminate Pareto inferior equilibria?
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Individuals' inability to coordinate investment may significantly constrain economic development. In this paper we study a simple investment game characterized by multiple equilibria and ask whether an income-based incentive scheme can uniquely implement the high-investment outcome. A general property of this game is the presence of a crossover-investment point at which an individual's incomes from investment and non-investment are equal. We show that arbitrarily small errors in the government's knowledge of this crossover point can prevent unique implementation of the high-investment outcome. We conclude that informational requirements are likely to severely limit a government's ability to use income-based incentive schemes as a coordination device.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 83, Issue 2, July 2007, Pages 368-391
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 83, Issue 2, July 2007, Pages 368-391
نویسندگان
Philip Bond, Rohini Pande,