کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5095280 | 1376280 | 2007 | 35 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Moral hazard and Marshallian inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia
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موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Moral hazard and Marshallian inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia Moral hazard and Marshallian inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia](/preview/png/5095280.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We formalize the link between optimal cost-sharing contracts and the production technology in the presence of moral hazard by appealing to several well-known results from duality theory. Building on intuitions from the interlinkage literature, we show that optimal contractual structure is determined by the (i) substitution possibilities that exist between different observable factor inputs, as well as (ii) between these inputs and unobservable effort. We endogenize contractual choice using landlord characteristics as instruments, exploiting the fact that, in our dataset, landlords interact with several tenants and vice versa. The approach is applied to an unbalanced plot-level panel of cost-sharing contracts in a Tunisian village, using a translog representation of the restricted profit function. Contractual terms are found to be a significant determinant of input use and therefore lead to Marshallian inefficiency, while the optimality of the underlying contractual structure is rejected.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 83, Issue 2, July 2007, Pages 411-445
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 83, Issue 2, July 2007, Pages 411-445
نویسندگان
Jean-Louis Arcand, Chunrong Ai, François Ethier,