کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5095285 | 1376280 | 2007 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
An efficiency and welfare classification of rationing by waiting in the presence of bribery
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
Governments often allocate commodities at low prices and on a first-come-first-served basis (rationing by waiting), while bureaucrats who distribute the commodities usually take bribes. A model is developed to classify the efficiency implications of bribery, and socially optimal pricing schemes in rationing by waiting. If the rationed good and individual income spent on other goods ('other' income) are 'complements', then bribery may enhance allocative efficiency, and a 'dual pricing' scheme can augment social welfare. However, if the rationed commodity and 'other' income are 'substitutes', then bribery may not improve allocative efficiency, and distributing the rationed commodity free is socially optimal.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 83, Issue 2, July 2007, Pages 530-548
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 83, Issue 2, July 2007, Pages 530-548
نویسندگان
Praveen Kulshreshtha,