کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5095365 1478514 2006 24 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategic interaction in undeveloped credit markets
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Strategic interaction in undeveloped credit markets
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies the strategic interaction between informal and formal lenders in undeveloped credit markets. In a model with adverse selection, loan seniority, market power, and differences in the cost of lending, it is shown that under general conditions a co-funding equilibrium will be a Nash outcome of the game. We demonstrate that a collateral requirement in connection with formal loans always generates a new co-funding equilibrium in which both lenders earn higher profits. A government subsidy to the formal lender may have the opposite effect. We relate our results to existing empirical evidence and the emerging discussion of how to best ensure financial viability and outreach of microfinance institutions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 80, Issue 2, August 2006, Pages 275-298
نویسندگان
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