کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5095365 | 1478514 | 2006 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Strategic interaction in undeveloped credit markets
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper studies the strategic interaction between informal and formal lenders in undeveloped credit markets. In a model with adverse selection, loan seniority, market power, and differences in the cost of lending, it is shown that under general conditions a co-funding equilibrium will be a Nash outcome of the game. We demonstrate that a collateral requirement in connection with formal loans always generates a new co-funding equilibrium in which both lenders earn higher profits. A government subsidy to the formal lender may have the opposite effect. We relate our results to existing empirical evidence and the emerging discussion of how to best ensure financial viability and outreach of microfinance institutions.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 80, Issue 2, August 2006, Pages 275-298
Journal: Journal of Development Economics - Volume 80, Issue 2, August 2006, Pages 275-298
نویسندگان
Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Nikolaj Malchow-Møller,