کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
5101857 1479410 2017 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Trade in fossil fuel deposits for preservation and strategic action
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
تجارت در ذخایر فسیلی برای حفاظت و اقدام استراتژیک
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
In the world economy with interdependent markets for fossil fuel deposits and extracted fossil fuel, some coalition of countries may fight climate change by purchasing and preserving fossil fuel deposits, which would be exploited otherwise. Assuming that deposits are traded on a market with a uniform price, we find that the outcome is efficient if the coalition is a price taker in both markets, but inefficient if it acts strategically in the deposit market but not in the fuel market, or acts strategically in both markets. The latter result demonstrates that Harstad's (2012, Theorem 1) 'efficiency-despite-strategic-action result' is not robust with respect to changes in the concepts of the deposit market and market (or bargaining) power. In a simplified parametric version of the game, a strategically acting coalition buys fewer deposits, consumes more fuel, and puts up with higher climate damage than in first-best.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 147, March 2017, Pages 50-61
نویسندگان
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