کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
5106749 | 1481650 | 2017 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Myopic PPPs: Risk allocation and hidden liabilities for taxpayers and users
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
مهندسی انرژی
انرژی (عمومی)
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چکیده انگلیسی
Drawing on evidence from three case studies, we show how the State's Financial Liability has worked in assigning risk in large PPP contracts in Spain. Project failure and the concessionaires' bankruptcy have resulted in the government having to assume heavy financial obligations, which have ultimately been absorbed by taxpayers and users. In contrast, Spain's leading construction companies, which were also major investors in the concessionaires, have been able to minimize their risk. Myopic PPPs have been entered into based on the transference of liabilities to taxpayers and users, and the, consequent, minimization of risks for the main private investors.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Utilities Policy - Volume 48, October 2017, Pages 147-156
Journal: Utilities Policy - Volume 48, October 2017, Pages 147-156
نویسندگان
Germà Bel, Paula Bel-Piñana, Jordi Rosell,