Securing safe food, order in cities and protected urban livelihoods: Modelling of preference for regulations of informal street food trade in Kumasi

Inability to isolate and target informal food trader priorities in compliance behaviour, in the face of multi-attribute regulations, has made food control in developing countries ineffective (low food quality and disorderly urban-space usage persist) and costly (high time and money cost to vendors). Using systematically sampled informal street food vendors in Ghana's second largest urban space, we assess preference patterns and dynamics of informal sector operators for regulatory aspects/scenarios through Discrete Choice Experiment. We unearthed contrasting preferences for aspects of improved regulation such that vendors gravitated towards improved siting regulations but abhorred improved health certification. Preference patterns were mainly explained by economic stature of enterprises, profiteering motives of operation, distrust of Local Assemblies and abuse of discretional power among food control officers. Our study implies that, informal sector is, less likely to accept mandatory licensing with costly preconditions/higher monetary commitments. Also, cost-effective improvements in siting regulations are primers of improved regulatory regime with vendor associations as essential entry point. Specific to street food trade, holistic approach rather than improved perceptions and relations among vendors and food control officers is more likely to ensure implementation of higher street food safety standards.