کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
6371532 | 1318925 | 2011 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
A condition for cooperation in a game on complex networks
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری
علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک
علوم کشاورزی و بیولوژیک (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We study a condition of favoring cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma game on complex networks. There are two kinds of players: cooperators and defectors. Cooperators pay a benefit b to their neighbors at a cost c, whereas defectors only receive a benefit. The game is a death-birth process with weak selection. Although it has been widely thought that b/c>ãkã is a condition of favoring cooperation (Ohtsuki et al., 2006), we find that b/c>ãknnã is the condition. We also show that among three representative networks, namely, regular, random, and scale-free, a regular network favors cooperation the most, whereas a scale-free network favors cooperation the least. In an ideal scale-free network, cooperation is never realized. Whether or not the scale-free network and network heterogeneity favor cooperation depends on the details of the game, although it is occasionally believed that these favor cooperation irrespective of the game structure.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology - Volume 269, Issue 1, 21 January 2011, Pages 224-233
Journal: Journal of Theoretical Biology - Volume 269, Issue 1, 21 January 2011, Pages 224-233
نویسندگان
Tomohiko Konno,