Manipulative Imputation in Distributed Decision Support Settings: The Implications of Information Asymmetry and Aggregation Complexity

According to earlier research, distributed communications are susceptible to deception. Our study complements the existing works by analyzing group members' attempts to manipulate group decisions supported by distributed communications. Experimentally, we examined the impact of two systemic features of distributed decision support on the group member's manipulative imputation. First, we analyzed the member's manipulative imputation for information asymmetry. Second, we analyzed this relationship for the moderating effect of decision rule complexity. Both of these features are structural properties of aggregating information exchange. We confirmed several effects: An increase in the asymmetry of information aggregating into a group outcome increases the member's manipulative tendency. This increase also increases the effectiveness of the member's manipulative imputation. However, the complexity of a decision rule decreases both of these effects. Given the information asymmetry, complexity of issues under group members' consideration can authenticate their disclosures. We point out the theoretical relevance and practical implications of our findings.