کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7242566 | 1471618 | 2018 | 18 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Signaling, reputation and spinoffs
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
سیگنالینگ، شهرت و اسپینوف
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
I propose a new channel of spinoff (firm formed when an employee leaves to set up his own firm) formation in which the returns from spinning off are determined endogenously. If high ability workers are scarce, then despite the principal's ability to offer contracts (endogenous cost of signaling), there exists a separating equilibrium where the high type worker signals his ability by forming a spinoff. This result provides theoretical support to the empirical findings of Skogstrøm (2012). When moral hazard is introduced in the baseline model of adverse selection, I show that the spinoff equilibrium can generate the strongest incentives to work. This has policy implications for non-compete clauses.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 149, May 2018, Pages 88-105
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 149, May 2018, Pages 88-105
نویسندگان
Suraj Shekhar,