کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
7242684 | 1471622 | 2018 | 48 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Incomplete contracting, renegotiation, and expectation-based loss aversion
ترجمه فارسی عنوان
قرارداد ناتمام، مذاکره مجدد، و ناامیدی از دست دادن انتظارات
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
چکیده انگلیسی
We consider a simple trading relationship between an expectation-based loss-averse buyer and a profit-maximizing seller. When writing a long-term contract the parties have to rely on renegotiation in order to ensure materially efficient trade ex post. We show that if the buyer expects renegotiation to occur, the seller can opportunistically exploit the buyer's attachment to the expected outcome of renegotiation. In other words, incomplete contracts create a new type of hold-up problem. If credible, the buyer prefers to expect not to renegotiate, which gives rise to ex post inefficiencies. In a next step, we allow the buyer to undertake a non-contractible investment. We find that loss aversion can mitigate the traditional hold-up problem.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 145, January 2018, Pages 176-201
Journal: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization - Volume 145, January 2018, Pages 176-201
نویسندگان
Fabian Herweg, Heiko Karle, Daniel Müller,